青島希尼爾翻譯公司（www.googlemapbuilder.com）整理發(fā)布2017-08-04

希尼爾翻譯公司（www.googlemapbuilder.com）2017年8月4日了解到：Carrie Lam had been in the job as Hong Kong’s chief executive less than a month when she threatened to shut its financial community in a room until it sorted out the city’s markets. That might have sounded extreme but, just days later, one of the likely prisoners responded with an analogy of the situation that involved the city’s regulator bringing out its “handcuffs, tear gas and big guns”.

香港特首林鄭月娥(Carrie Lam，見(jiàn)上圖)就任還不到一個(gè)月，就威脅要把該市的金融界關(guān)在一間屋子里，直到他們解決香港市場(chǎng)的問(wèn)題。這可能聽(tīng)起來(lái)有點(diǎn)極端，但就在幾天后，其中一名可能被關(guān)在屋子的人士做出回應(yīng)，把當(dāng)前局面比喻為該市監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)祭出“槍枝、手銬等多種大火力武器”。
Hong Kong’s financial watchdogs are toughening their language. And in a city where the stock market is at the heart of its financial power — played by rich and poor alike — that means something. Asked about suspected cases of market manipulation, including the small-cap crash in July that wiped $6bn off stocks in hours, Ms Lam told a forum that the city needed stronger leadership in the sector. “We need to bring together our regulators and our market development practitioners,” she said, “and perhaps lock them in a room and let them find out the way forward for Hong Kong.”
香港的金融監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)正在放出狠話。在股市位于其金融實(shí)力核心、窮人和富人都在股市操盤(pán)的這個(gè)城市，這是有相當(dāng)大分量的。在被問(wèn)及疑似市場(chǎng)操縱個(gè)案（包括7月份小盤(pán)股崩盤(pán)，導(dǎo)致60億美元市值在幾小時(shí)內(nèi)蒸發(fā)）時(shí)，林鄭月娥對(duì)一個(gè)論壇表示，該市金融業(yè)需要更強(qiáng)有力的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)。她表示，香港需要匯集監(jiān)管者和市場(chǎng)發(fā)展從業(yè)人員，也許把他們鎖在一間屋子里，讓他們找到香港的前進(jìn)道路。
Charles Li, chief executive of the Hong Kong exchange, then brought handcuffs to the party, defending the HKEX’s actions by likening its position to a traffic cop against the sheriff role played by the city’s watchdog, the Securities and Futures Commission.
香港交易所(HKEx)行政總裁李小加(Charles Li)隨后用手銬做比喻，捍衛(wèi)港交所的行動(dòng)，將其比作一個(gè)交警，在職責(zé)上有別于“刑警”——該市金融監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)證券及期貨事務(wù)監(jiān)察委員會(huì)(SFC)。
“Standard gear for the traffic cop is a whistle, a night stick and an alcohol detection device,” wrote Mr Li in a blog last week. “Those tools are effective to control the traffic, but are not terribly useful when it comes to apprehending suspects or deterring violations. The sheriff’s department is, however, equipped with big flashlights, handcuffs, tear gas and big guns. Those heavy weapons do not work well with the general traffic but they are highly effective in capturing and deterring criminals.”
“交警僅配備哨子、指揮棒、酒精探測(cè)器和路障設(shè)置等，”李小加上周在一篇博文中寫(xiě)道。 “在日常交通管制上，這些工具是有效的，但碰到重大案件時(shí)沒(méi)有什么威懾力。而刑警則配備各類槍枝、手銬等多種大火力武器，必要時(shí)還可以進(jìn)行搜查與拘捕。這些武器可威懾罪犯，并非為管理普通民眾而配備的。”
Confronted with such a convoluted analogy, most Hong Kong market players would probably prefer the simplicity of a locked room and an order from Ms Lam to produce a solution. But the problems involved are too complex for a quiet room and a pot of coffee to solve.
面對(duì)這樣一個(gè)復(fù)雜的類比，大多數(shù)香港市場(chǎng)參與者很可能更喜歡林鄭月娥的簡(jiǎn)潔言論：一間上鎖的房間，由她下令拿出一個(gè)解決方案。但是這里涉及的種種問(wèn)題太過(guò)復(fù)雜，不是一間安靜的房間和一壺咖啡能夠解決的。
At its heart, the city is battling to make a system with its roots in the colonial era suitable to maintain its status as a leading global centre for initial public offerings — all the while coping with the flood of Chinese companies and capital that raised it to the top of the rankings in the first place. Problems have inevitably followed, not least shares that can rocket and plunge for no clear reason. Another wrinkle has been so-called “shell farming”, where companies list in the expectation a majority stake will eventually be bought by another group keen on a listing without the rigours of an initial public offering.
問(wèn)題的核心是，該市正在努力調(diào)整一套根植于殖民時(shí)代的制度，使其適合維持香港作為一個(gè)全球領(lǐng)先的首次公開(kāi)發(fā)行(IPO)中心的地位——與此同時(shí)應(yīng)對(duì)內(nèi)地企業(yè)和資本的洪流，正是這股洪流使香港升至排行榜首位。各種問(wèn)題不可避免地接踵而來(lái)，尤其是股價(jià)會(huì)出現(xiàn)貌似無(wú)厘頭的大漲大跌。另一個(gè)問(wèn)題是所謂的“啤殼”，即公司上市的初衷就是讓急于上市、但不想走IPO嚴(yán)格審批程序的另一家集團(tuán)買(mǎi)下其多數(shù)股權(quán)。
But not all problems emanate north of the border. Hong Kong has its own rich history of financial shenanigans. Insider trading, after all, was not criminalised until 2003. Tycoons including Li Ka-shing were among those censured when a rap on the knuckles was all the authorities could do. Mainland press still refer darkly to the tricksters — loh tsin in Cantonese — believed to lurk amid the smaller stocks in the Hong Kong market.
但并不是所有問(wèn)題都源自內(nèi)地。香港歷史上的金融欺詐手段并不少見(jiàn)。畢竟，內(nèi)幕交易直到2003年才被界定為刑事犯罪。包括李嘉誠(chéng)(Li Ka-shing)在內(nèi)的大佬都曾受到批評(píng)，而批評(píng)是那時(shí)當(dāng)局能夠采取的最嚴(yán)厲行動(dòng)。內(nèi)地媒體仍然陰暗地提到粵語(yǔ)所稱的“老千股”（大股東不以做好上市公司業(yè)務(wù)來(lái)盈利，而是采取不正當(dāng)手段占小股東便宜的股票——譯者注），據(jù)信香港市值較小的股票中有一些這類股票。
One headache is just how to tackle all the problems, and in what order. Recently both the HKEX and the SFC have begun acting more aggressively in individual cases to block IPOs or question capital raisings. In the past year, the two have also consulted on streamlining the listings process, reforming the city’s junior market and creating an entirely new board that could allow dual-class shares — a sore point for the city since it lost Alibaba’s float to New York in 2013 over that issue.
令人頭痛的是如何解決所有這些問(wèn)題，以及按什么順序來(lái)解決。近期，香港交易所和證監(jiān)會(huì)均已開(kāi)始對(duì)一些個(gè)案采取更加強(qiáng)勢(shì)的行動(dòng)，阻止IPO或質(zhì)疑資本募集操作。過(guò)去一年里，兩家監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)還發(fā)起了一系列意見(jiàn)征詢，涵蓋精簡(jiǎn)上市流程、改革香港初級(jí)市場(chǎng)，以及創(chuàng)建一個(gè)可能允許雙層股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的新市場(chǎng)——自2013年香港因?yàn)檫@個(gè)問(wèn)題而與阿里巴巴(Alibaba)的上市失之交臂，導(dǎo)致該公司赴紐約上市以來(lái)，這一直是香港的一個(gè)痛點(diǎn)。
香港金融監(jiān)管不僅需要“交警”和“刑警”.jpg

But most agree there is one single problem that even Ms Lam is powerless to solve — the fact that the regulators have limited powers to pursue directors, executives and traders across the border whatever officials say about mainland co-operation. On one occasion, the chairman of a listed group flatly told the SFC he could not guarantee co-operation by the group’s Chinese parent — in spite of the fact he controlled that company.

但是多數(shù)人認(rèn)為，有一個(gè)問(wèn)題是就連林鄭月娥也無(wú)力解決的，它源于這樣一個(gè)事實(shí)：監(jiān)管者在追究?jī)?nèi)地董事、高管和交易員的責(zé)任方面權(quán)力有限，無(wú)論官員們就內(nèi)地合作說(shuō)些什么。有一次，一家上市集團(tuán)的董事長(zhǎng)坦白地告訴證監(jiān)會(huì)，盡管他控制著該公司，但他無(wú)法保證集團(tuán)的內(nèi)地母公司會(huì)配合。
“It is all very well being traffic cops and sheriffs, but what do you do when most of the miscreants are driving around with the equivalent of diplomatic plates?” asks one long-time equity market specialist.
“有關(guān)交警和刑警的比喻都很好，但在多數(shù)歹徒用外交牌照開(kāi)車的時(shí)候，你怎么辦？”一名長(zhǎng)期研究股市的專家問(wèn)道。
Which is one way of saying it will take more than tough talk and extensive analogies to work through the many issues facing Hong Kong’s markets.
這也就是說(shuō)，要解決香港市場(chǎng)面臨的諸多問(wèn)題，需要的不只是狠話和長(zhǎng)篇比喻。

來(lái)源:可可英語(yǔ)